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 Executive Summary 
 
 This paper critically reviews the draft of the Office of Management and Budget’s second 
report on the costs and benefits of federal regulation. The purpose of this analysis is to offer 
constructive recommendations for improving that report. Our main conclusion is that the OMB 
report represents an improvement over the previous year in terms of the quantity of information 
presented and the nature of the presentation. However, it still has some serious problems that 
need to be addressed. Perhaps the most serious deficiency is that the OMB fails to take adequate 





An Analysis of the Second Government Draft Report  
on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 
 




 The direct costs of federal environmental, health, and safety regulation have grown 
dramatically in recent decades, and are probably on the order of $200 billion annually.
1 These 
regulatory costs, which are about the size of all federal domestic, non-defense discretionary 
spending, are expected to grow significantly in the next decade. The benefits of those regulations 
are even less certain. Yet, the economic impacts of regulation receive much less scrutiny than 
direct, budgeted government spending.  
 
 The potential gains of regulatory reform are substantial. Research suggests that more than 
half of the federal government's regulations would fail a strict benefit-cost test using the 
government's own numbers.
2 Moreover, there is ample research suggesting that regulation could 
be significantly improved, so we could save more lives with fewer resources.
3 One study found 
that a reallocation of mandated expenditures toward those regulations with the highest payoff to 
society could save as many as 60,000 more lives a year at no additional cost.
4  
 
 Recently, Congress has begun to show a greater interest in assessing the economic impact 
of regulation. In 1996, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska added an amendment to the Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 that required the director of the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) to provide Congress with estimates of the total annual costs and benefits of 
all federal regulatory programs and estimates of the costs and benefits of individual regulations. 
This statute is the first to mandate such an accounting. In September of 1997, the OMB produced 
its first report on the costs and benefits of regulation in response to the Stevens amendment, and 
it recently completed a draft of its second report.
5,6 This paper critically reviews the draft of the 
                                            
1 Unless otherwise noted, all dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars. 
2 See Hahn (1998b). 
3 See Morrall (1986) and Viscusi (1996). 
4 See Tengs and Graham (1996). 
5 See OMB (1997) and OMB (1998). The page numbers cited in OMB (1998) are taken from the version in the 
Federal Register, which was downloaded from http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OMB/html/fedreg.html.  
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OMB’s second report. Section 2 provides an evaluation of the report and offers 
recommendations for improvement. Section 3 concludes. 
 
 Our main conclusion is that the report represents an improvement over the previous year 
in terms of the quantity of information presented and the nature of the presentation. However, it 
still has some serious problems that should be rectified. Perhaps the most serious deficiency is 
that the OMB fails to take adequate advantage of its deep in-house expertise in providing a 
candid assessment of the costs and benefits of regulation. 
 
 
2.Evaluation and Recommendations 
 
 The first OMB report on the costs and benefits of federal regulation was pathbreaking in 
that it was the first comprehensive attempt by a government agency to tally up federal regulatory 
costs and benefits.
7 The second draft report builds on that effort and makes several 
improvements. These include presenting upper and lower bound estimates on individual and 
aggregate impacts of regulation; developing a more comprehensive database on the costs and 
benefits of recent regulations based on an agency’s own analysis; presenting more information 
on the aggregate costs and benefits of regulation; monetizing benefits that were quantified, but 
not monetized, by the agencies; presenting new information on regulations assessed by 
independent agencies; comparing “before-and-after” economic evaluations of selected 




 While these improvements are important, the report leaves the reader with the misguided 
impression that the regulatory process and regulation are generally improving.
9 We find it hard 
to reconcile this with the fact that the number of regulations that would not pass a strict benefit-
cost test using the government’s numbers is still significant. 
                                                                                                                                             
6 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is the office within the OMB that is responsible for overseeing 
regulation and it also has primary responsibility for producing the report discussed here. 
7 See OMB (1997). 
8 See OMB (1996) and Arrow et al. (1996). 
9 For example, the OMB claims, “that agencies are continuing to reform and improve their regulatory programs.” 




 The following ten recommendations include suggestions for improving this report and 
suggestions that the OMB may consider including in their report to Congress. 
 
Recommendations for Improving the Draft Report 
 
Recommendation 1: The OMB should rely more heavily on its own expertise 
to inform judgments about the costs and benefits of regulation and the 
quality of agency analysis. 
 
 One problem with both the first OMB report and the draft of the second report is that they 
fail to take advantage of the expertise that resides within the OMB to evaluate the economic 
impact of regulations. The major advantage that the OMB analysts have over other potential 
authors of this report, such as academics, is that they are more familiar with the details of 
regulations and regulatory analyses. Nowhere in the report does the OMB take advantage of its 
expertise to provide estimates that would allow a comparison with the estimates prepared by the 
agencies.  
 
 We think this is a fundamental problem that the OMB should address by providing its 
own best estimates of the costs and benefits of individual regulations and regulatory activity in 
general.
10 Where possible, it should also provide quantitative information on the uncertainty of 
the estimate, such as a range.
11 It is clear from the OMB’s earlier correspondence with the 
agencies that it frequently disagrees with agency assessments. Those disagreements should be 
highlighted and explained in a document such as this. Thus, the OMB review could provide a 
kind of quality check on agency analyses.
12 
 
 The OMB should also not treat all estimates as equal. For example, it cites OECD work 
on measuring the economic impact of deregulation using macroeconomic models.
13 It is better to 
                                            
10 The best estimate should be a single number, not a range. 
11 More information on the nature of the uncertainty, such as the variance, should be provided when it is available. 
12 It may not be possible to perform this assessment in the current report; however, the OMB has the technical 
expertise to provide such evaluations in future reports. 
13 See OMB (1998, 44040) and OECD (1997).  
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 The OMB should continue to evaluate regulation in accord with its report on Best 
Practices. In this draft, it presents examples of how agencies properly applied best practices in 
their regulatory analyses.
15 This discussion should be complemented by a discussion of how 
agencies did not apply best practices as well. 
  
Recommendation 2: The OMB should focus more on the incremental costs 
and benefits of new regulations and less on aggregate economic impacts. 
 
 Both the aggregate impacts and incremental impacts of regulation are important. There 
are, however, diminishing returns to focusing on aggregate impacts because this is not where the 
OMB’s expertise lies. Moreover, measures of aggregate impacts do not help inform decisions on 
individual regulations, although they can affect overall policy. Whether the aggregate impact of 
past regulation has been beneficial on net, as the EPA study suggests, or closer to neutral, is 
largely immaterial for policies that are pursued in the future. Each of those regulatory policies 
needs to be evaluated on its own merits.
16 Thus, the OMB should focus on incremental impacts 
of recent and proposed regulations because Congress and regulators can most easily influence 
decisions regarding those regulations.
17 
  
Recommendation 3: The OMB should be careful to avoid making statements 
about net costs and benefits that can not be substantiated. 
 
 There are several statements about the nature of regulatory benefits and reforms that 
require further explanation. For example, the OMB argues, “that agencies are continuing to 
reform and improve their regulatory programs”
18 without providing any facts to support this 
assertion. Another example concerns statements about the benefits of certain regulatory 
activities. The report does not estimate the net benefits of antitrust activity, but claims that 
                                            
14 For example, see Winston (1993). For a piece suggesting that many of the gains from deregulation may have been 
underestimated, see Winston (1998). 
15 See OMB (1998, 44050).  
16 See US EPA (1997). 
17 As the report recognizes, there is an important role for scholarship evaluating the impact of existing regulations. 
18 See OMB (1998, 44055).  
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“clearly this type of government policy creates important social benefits.”
19 In this case, some 
indication of the magnitude would be useful. Moreover, the report estimates that disclosure costs 
for some independent regulatory agencies are about $7 billion and then argues that “although 
benefits have not been quantified we expect that they are significantly greater than $7 billion.”
20 
The OMB’s assertion may be correct, but the basis for its expectation is unclear and the agency 
should state it. 
 
Recommendation 4: The OMB should work on presenting results in ways 
that could be more useful for policy makers. 
 
 The OMB offers a number of different ways of presenting information on aggregate 
benefits and individual regulation. It would be helpful to expand the presentation in some areas. 
At the aggregate level, the OMB should carefully note categories in which the aggregate benefits 
exceed the costs. For example, it appears that controlling particulate matter and lead resulted in 
large aggregate net benefits while controls on the remaining pollutants either did not offer 
positive net benefits or had insufficient evidence about net benefits to permit a conclusion. It 
would also be useful to know the pattern of costs and benefits over time, so one could get an idea 
of the marginal net benefits from controlling pollution in a given year. In principle such 




 In examining individual regulations, it would be helpful if the OMB aggregated some of 
the information into a scorecard. For example, a scorecard could specify the number of 
regulations that pass or fail a cost-benefit test using available data about monetary benefits of 
rules.
22 The OMB should also consider aggregating net costs and benefits by regulatory program 
and by agency. Such a presentation would help identify programs that should be improved or 
eliminated. Finally, the OMB could rank rules by the agencies and the OMB’s best estimate of 
their expected net benefits and cost-effectiveness.
23 Much of the raw material for these kinds of 
assessments is in the draft OMB report or could be constructed by using the OMB database. 
                                            
19 The report notes that it does not estimate the benefits of antitrust activities. See OMB (1998, 44038Footnote 6 in 
the report.).  
20 See OMB (1998, 44041). 
21 See US EPA (1997). 
22 See, for example, Federal Focus (1995) and Hahn (1998c). 
23 See Morrall (1986).  
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 One important step taken by the OMB was to monetize benefits of selected regulations 
where agencies had reported some other quantifiable estimate, such as reductions in pollution. 
This is important, but they should go further. For example, the OMB should consider applying a 
standard statistical value of life saved across different activities.
24 
 
Recommendation 5: The OMB should interpret its mandate broadly to 
include major regulatory initiatives at independent agencies and future 
policies that could involve major regulatory authority. 
 
 This year, the OMB included a very good discussion of major rules issued by 
independent agencies. However, it should have gone further and analyzed some proposed 
regulatory initiatives, such as the requirement that long distance subscribers have their rates 
increased in order to subsidize connecting schools and libraries to the Internet. In that case, 
analysis and data were available.
25 
 
 An even more important omission is the absence of a review of the Administration’s 
policies for addressing climate change.
26 A careful analysis of that document would have 
revealed that it has serious flaws.  These include a failure to provide a quantitative or monetized 
estimate of the incremental benefits of climate protection from the Administration’s policies, a 
failure to compare the costs and benefits of the policy, a failure to assess reasonable alternatives, 
such as less stringent targets and timetables, and an overly optimistic assessment of how 
international permit markets will lower U.S. costs for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Indeed, there is evidence that the Administration’s proposal does not conform to the OMB’s Best 
Practices for the economic analysis of regulations. 
 
Recommendation 6: The OMB should more carefully evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of the EPA §812 retrospective study if it wants to use those 
numbers. Specifically, it should estimate the sensitivity of the study’s results 
to changes in arbitrary assumptions.  
                                            
24 We recognize there are theoretical reasons that this number can vary across life-saving activities, but presenting 
both analyses might be useful to see how sensitive the results were to such comparisons. The OMB should also 
consider using life-years when this is available, or even quality-adjusted life-years. 
25 The so-called “e-rate” regulation looks very much like a tax, but it is regulatory in the sense that a regulatory 
agency implemented the policy. Hausman argues that the economic welfare losses associated with the imposition of 
the e-rate on telephone companies, and ultimately consumers, is on the order of $2.4 billion per year in 1998 dollars. 
See Hausman (1998, 19) 
26 See Administration’s Economic Analysis (1997).  
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 Undoubtedly, one of the most controversial parts of the OMB report is its use of the EPA 
§812 retrospective study, which provides estimates of the aggregate benefits of Clean Air. An 
incisive critique of that aspect of the report is contained in Lutter.
27 A few general points can be 
made. First, based on the EPA study, the OMB says benefits could be as high as $3.38 trillion, 
which is over 40 percent of GNP.
28 While it is possible, it would seem to defy common sense to 
think that past federal environmental regulations netted that much for the economy.
29 Second, a 
series of technical assumptions and omissions suggest the benefits are overestimated. Possible 
sources of bias include definition of the baseline;
30See OMB (1998, 44043).
31 the estimation of 
benefits using willingness to pay estimates for incremental changes in risk; the omission of costs 
associated with increases in harmful Ultraviolet-B radiation; and the assumption that reductions 
in particulate matter concentrations yield health benefits immediately without any delay. The 
OMB notes, for example, that a reasonable change in the assumption about the latency period 
between the onset of emission reductions and the reduction in health risks would cut the upper 
bound benefit number by a factor of two, or $1.26 trillion!
32 Third, the OMB should have 
directly incorporated these plausible scenarios into its own estimates of net benefits. Instead, the 
OMB chose to take the EPA study’s numbers as given for purposes of reporting the range on 
benefits. This may be the safest way out, but we think it is also misleading. 
 
Making Recommendations to Congress 
 
 We would urge the OMB to be bolder in its recommendations to Congress, since 
Congress specifically requested that the OMB help provide such suggestions.
33 
                                            
27 See Lutter (1998). 
28 See OMB (1997, 44044). 
29 Looked at another way, the calculation suggests that people should be willing to give up over 40 percent of all 
good and services currently produced for those benefits! 
30 The EPA study assumes that no additional controls would have been in place in the absence of federal programs. 
31 See OMB (1998, 44043). 
32 See OMB (1998, 44035). 
33 Section 625 (a)(4) of the Treasury and Government Appropriations Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-61) directs the OMB to 
provide, “Recommendations from the Director and a description of significant public comments to reform or 
eliminate any Federal regulatory program or program element that is inefficient, ineffective, or is not a sound use of 
the Nation’s resources.” See OMB (1998, 44034).  
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Recommendation 7: The OMB should list programs for reform and 
elimination. 
 
 For two years in a row, the OMB report has concluded that it cannot identify programs 
for reform or elimination.
34 Yet, ironically, the OMB has no problem advocating the 
Administration’s proposal for electricity reform.
35 
 
 Because the OMB is still “seeking comment on regulatory programs or program elements 
that are inefficient, ineffective, or not a sound usage of the nation’s resources,”
36 we thought we 
would present a table to initiate the discussion. Table 1 provides suggestions for a number of 
laws and regulations that should be eliminated based on economic efficiency. It reveals that the 
programs span both economic and social regulation. As can be seen from the table, annual 
welfare losses are in the billions of dollars for some programs. There is also ample room for 
significantly reforming regulatory programs. For example, expenditures on the Superfund 
program to clean hazardous waste sites could be dramatically reduced while enhancing economic 
efficiency and reducing overall risk.
37 
 
Recommendation 8: The OMB should examine strategic reforms that could 
improve the regulatory process. 
 
 The OMB is well positioned to identify improvements for the quality of regulatory 
analysis. For example, it could suggest a series of rewards and sanctions for agencies that 
conduct good analysis. Those rewards could take the form of financial incentives or incentives 
related to the oversight process itself. Agencies that routinely produce high quality analysis could 
be subjected to less oversight by the OMB. 
 
 The OMB should consider evaluating different proposals for providing better information 
on the impacts of regulation. One such proposal that has merit is the Congressional Office of 
                                            
34 The OMB states at the end of the draft report that “...at this stage we do not believe it is appropriate to make 
recommendations on specific regulatory programs based on the incomplete and uneven data that we discuss at 
length above.” See OMB (1998, 44055). 
35 See OMB (1998, 44055). 
36 See OMB (1998, 44054). 
37 See Viscusi and Hamilton (forthcoming).  
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Regulatory Analysis. A Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis is a good idea because it 
could provide another credible source of information on the costs and benefits of regulation. 
 
Recommendation 9: The OMB should suggest how Congress could use 
publications, such as the Federal Register, to make the regulatory process 
more transparent. 
 
 The Federal Register is a central repository of information on regulation, and it is easily 
accessible. It could be used to improve the regulatory process by providing information to 
interested parties in a "user-friendly" format. While current Federal Register notices on 
regulatory activities exhibit a wide degree of variation, Congress could instruct the OMB to 
develop a standardized framework that agencies could use to present information on the 
economic impact of regulations.
38 
 
Recommendation 10: The OMB should suggest that Congress require OMB 
and all federal regulatory agencies to produce an annual report on the costs 
and benefits of regulatory activities.  
 
 Requiring each regulatory agency to produce an annual report on the costs and benefits of 
its regulatory activities and requiring OMB to continue to produce an annual report on the costs 
and benefits of all agency regulatory activities would make the regulatory process more 
transparent. These requirements could also improve estimates of the economic impact of 
regulatory activity.  In addition, the agency reports would help OMB produce its overall 
assessment of the impact of  federal regulation.  
 
 This is the second consecutive year in which the OMB has produced a report on the 
economic impacts of federal regulation. It appears that the OMB will not produce it for another 
two years. Two years is too long. The machinery is in place to produce this report annually, the 
incremental costs are low, and the value-added is high.  Congress should therefore require the 
OMB to produce this report annually. We believe both of the OMB reports are helping make the 
regulatory process more transparent, thus holding regulators and lawmakers more accountable 
for their actions.   
 
 Although agencies are not required to produce an annual report, many attempt to estimate 
the economic impact of specific regulations.  The production of an annual report would allow 
                                            
38 See Hahn (1998b).  
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agencies to synthesize the results of these analyses, and may help improve the analyses by 
highlighting inconsistencies or other weaknesses.  Ensuring independent agencies produce useful 
annual reports is perhaps the greatest challenge.  A consensus seems to be emerging that the 
independent agencies are producing little information that evaluates the economic impact of their 
regulations. This finding is consistent with the OMB’s review, a report by the General 
Accounting Office, and research by Furchtgott-Roth and Hahn.
39 The OMB notes that last year it 
received comments “from several independent economic regulatory agencies suggesting that we 
had not emphasized the potential benefits of economic regulation enough.”
40 The requirement of 





       
 This paper has provided a critical review of the OMB’s second draft report on the costs 
and benefits of regulation. That report is the best of its kind in the world. It improves on the 
previous year’s report by adding data and analysis in a variety of areas. We believe it will set the 
standard for the development of similar analyses at the state level and in other countries. 
 
 However, there is still need for improvement. The chief ingredient missing from this 
report is the collective wisdom of the OMB professionals that review regulations for a living. 
Those experts should provide an independent assessment of the economic impact of regulation. 
Sharing those insights would enable interested parties to obtain a better sense of how economists 
most familiar with the individual regulations tally up the costs and benefits. The OMB’s 
assessment could then be compared with independent assessments to develop a more complete 
picture of the costs and benefits of regulation. 
 
                                            
39 See GAO (1998), Hahn (1998c) and Furchtgott-Roth (1996). More generally, Hahn (1998c) and Furchtgott-Roth 
(1996) find that regulatory agencies provide very little information on the economic impacts of a large number of 
regulatory activities in which they are engaged. 
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Regulations and Programs That Could Be Targeted For Elimination 
 
Regulation/Act  Description  Welfare Loss 
International Trade 
Restrictions 
Various tariffs and quotas 
constrain international trade. 
$3.5 billion annual welfare 
loss (1990$) 
Jones Act  Ships traveling between 
U.S. ports must be built in 
U.S. shipyards, owned by 
U.S. citizens, and operated 
by an American crew. 
$2.8 billion annual welfare 
loss (1991$) 
Milk Marketing Orders  USDA price discrimination 
scheme raises the price of 
fluid milk and drives down 
the price of manufactured 
milk products. 
$343 - $608 million annual 
welfare loss (1985$) 
Davis-Bacon Act  Federally funded 
construction projects are 
required to pay laborers 
“prevailing wages.” 
$200 million annual welfare 
loss (1988$) 
Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards 
Each auto manufacturer 
must meet federal average 
fuel economy standards. 
$4 billion welfare loss from 
1978 through 1989 (1990$) 
Land Disposal Regulation  1995 Rule prohibits the 
disposal of various untreated 
hazardous wastes. 
$143 million annual 
expected cost. Benefits are 
not monetized (1992$) 
Off-Label Drug Use  Manufacturers cannot 
legally advertise a 
pharmaceutical product for 
any use that the FDA has 
not specifically approved. 
Not available 
Glass-Steagall Act  1933 Act prohibits 





Sources: Provided in Hahn (1998a). 
 
 